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Introduction 
In his new book The Importance of Being Rational, Errol Lord aims to give a real definition of the 
property of rationality in terms of normative reasons. If he can do so, his work is an important step 
towards a defense of ‘reasons fundamentalism’ – the thesis that all complex normative properties 
can be analyzed in terms of normative reasons. I will focus on his analysis of epistemic rationality, 
which says that your doxastic attitudes are rational just in case they are correct responses to the 
objective normative reasons you possess. For some fact to be an objective normative reason to do 
something that you possess, you have to be in a position to know this fact and be able to 
competently use it as a reason to do that thing. Lord’s view is thus a knowledge-first view about 
possessing normative reasons. 
Throughout the book, Lord conceptualizes belief in the traditional tripartite way – if you 
take any attitude at all towards a proposition, then you either believe it, or disbelieve it, or you 
suspend judgment about it. Lord doesn’t discuss cases in which we’re uncertain. Yet, those cases 
are ubiquitous, so I will explore how his view can be extended to them. I will first discuss whether 
his strategy for vindicating coherence requirements in terms of normative reasons can be applied 
to credences. I will then ask how Lord can conceive of the doxastic attitudes that encode 
uncertainty.  
 
1. Coherent Credences and Attenuation 
It is commonly assumed that it is irrational to have doxastic states that are inconsistent or 
incoherent in some way. In the case of outright belief, it is commonly assumed that it is irrational 
to believe p and to believe ~p simultaneously. Lord proposes to explain this in terms of possessed 
normative reasons: If the reasons you possess decisively support p, then you are rationally required 
to believe that p. Add to this the assumption that it’s never the case that a set of reasons can 
decisively support p and also give sufficient support for ~p. Hence, someone who has contradictory 
beliefs must be irrational, because they are not correctly responding to the reasons they possess. 
Their reasons can’t support both believing p and believing ~p.  
 Can this strategy be expanded to explain coherence requirements on credences? For now, 
I will take credences to be whichever doxastic attitudes encode uncertainty.1 For simplicity, I will 
focus on a basic coherence requirement that follows from the claim that one’s credences should be 
probabilistic. It says that it is rationally required that your credences in p and ~p add up to 1. How 
                                                        
1 Depending on which more specific view of credences one adopts, one may claim that they primarily encode 
uncertainty in their contents, or in the attitude itself. More on this in section 2. 
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can we explain this in terms of the objective normative reasons you possess?2 One immediate 
complication is that it is an open question whether a given body of evidence always decisively 
supports one specific credence assignment, or whether it sometimes permits a range of different 
credence assignments. I will discuss the permissive option first, show that it leads to two separate 
problems, and then explore whether denying permissivism helps.  
 Suppose Bob’s evidence permits any credence in p between 0.6 and 0.7, and hence any 
credence in ~p between 0.3 and 0.4. Say Bob’s evidence is the experience of tasting of his cocktail, 
which permits a credence between 0.6 and 0.7 that the cocktail contains cherry bitters (=p). Based 
on his evidence, Bob adopts a credence of 0.65 in p. To be coherent, he must adopt a credence of 
0.35 in ~p. How can Lord’s view explain this? As Lord illustrates in chapter two, permissive cases 
are problematic for a reasons-based account of coherence requirements. This is because it looks 
like when your reasons permit fing and also permit not fing, they also permit fing and not fing 
simultaneously, even when this is incoherent. Lord’s strategy for dealing with this problem is to 
appeal to the fact that reasons can be intensified and attenuated by other reasons. Suppose my 
reasons permit intending to order dessert, and they also permit intending not to order dessert. Yet, 
it would plausibly be irrational to have both intentions. Lord’s solution is to argue that once I form 
one of the intentions, e.g. to order dessert, the fact that I have this intention attenuates my reasons 
to intend not to order dessert to the point where they are insufficient to support such an intention. 
In other words, forming an attitude that is permitted by my reasons generates a reason, namely 
the fact that I have the attitude, which can itself affect the balance of reasons, and make it such 
that it is no longer permissible for me to form other attitudes that are incoherent with this attitude.  
To apply this to the case of coherent credences, we should examine examples of epistemic 
attenuators and intensifiers. Epistemic attenuators have been studied extensively, and are usually 
divided into different categories of defeaters.3 I will argue that our understanding of how epistemic 
attenuators, or defeaters, work doesn’t fit well with how Lord needs them to function in order to 
secure coherence requirements on credences. Suppose r is a reason to believe that p. If s is a rebutting 
defeater for r, it means that it weakens r’s support for p by lending support to ~p instead. If s is an 
undercutting defeater for r, then s weakens r’s ability to support p, but without lending additional 
support to ~p. Applying this idea to our permissive case, we should say that if Bob adopts credence 
0.65 in p, then the fact that he has this credence intensifies his reasons to adopt a 0.35 credence in 
~p to the point where they are decisive, and weakens his reasons to adopt any alternative credence 
in ~p. In epistemic terms, we should say that the fact that he formed this credence serves as a 
defeater for his evidence supporting a credence other than 0.35.  
While this solution technically secures coherence, I am worried that the mechanism Lord 
appeals to is not plausibly interpreted as being a genuine species of attenuation or defeat. To see 
why, I want to consider some ordinary cases of defeat. I will focus on partially undercutting 
defeaters, which seem most relevant here, but the argument could also be made with rebutting 
                                                        
2 Worsnip (2018) mentions that this type of case might present a problem for a reasons-based explanation of coherence, 
but doesn’t discuss Lord’s attenuator/intensifier solution. 
3 For a nice overview of different types of defeaters, see Sudduth (2008).  
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defeaters. The presence of a partially undercutting defeater makes it such that a piece of evidence 
is less indicative of the truth of some claim p than it would be if the defeater were absent. For 
example, suppose Jen says that Sam has a navy-blue car. I rationally become highly confident that 
Sam has a navy-blue car, because Jen’s testimony is good evidence for this. However, suppose I 
learn later that she only saw his car briefly in the dark. This fact serves as a partial undercutting 
defeater for Jen’s testimony, because people often can’t distinguish colors well in the dark. In light 
of this, Jen’s testimony is a less reliable indicator of the color of Sam’s car than I initially thought. 
Intensifiers work in a similar way. If I learn instead that Jen did the paint job on Sam’s car, this 
should presumably make me trust her testimony more, and increase my confidence that Sam’s car 
is navy-blue. 
Let’s now see if this mechanism can secure coherence in permissive cases. Recall that Bob’s 
evidence is his experience of his cocktail’s taste, which permits a credence between 0.6 and 0.7 that 
the drink contains cherry bitters. Bob adopts a 0.65 credence that it does. Does the fact that he has 
this credence influence how probable his experience makes the claim that the drink doesn’t contain 
cherry bitters? I don’t see how this could be. For his credence to work like a standard 
undercutting/intensifying defeater, it would have to make it the case that the evidence is now 
decisively in favor of a 0.35 credence in no cherry bitters. Yet, there’s no good explanation of why 
Bob’s reaction to the evidence would change its justifying power in any way. And this problem 
generalizes. It’s usually not the case that the fact that someone reacts to a body of evidence in a 
certain way influences what is supported by the evidence, and to what degree. Defeaters and 
intensifiers work by either making it so that the affected evidence is a less powerful indicator of the 
truth, or a more powerful one, and the fact that someone reacts to the evidence in a particular way 
doesn’t seem to do either of those things.  
You might think that sometimes, a person’s reaction to a body of evidence can be an 
indicator of what the evidence supports. For example, if you disagree with me about whether our 
evidence supports that we each owe $27.50 for lunch, this should perhaps make me question my 
evaluation of the evidence. However, the fact that you disagree doesn’t change whether my evidence 
in fact supports that we each owe $27.50. In other words, the fact that you disagree does not 
weaken my evidence, rather, it gives me grounds for checking my response to the evidence. Hence, 
this is not a case in which someone’s reaction to a body of evidence changes what the evidence in 
fact supports, and therefore not an instance of the type of attenuation Lord needs. Moreover, we’re 
just focused on cases involving one reasoner here. The fact that I take my evidence to support some 
attitude does not change whether or not the attitude is in fact rational for me (see e.g. Titelbaum 
2015, forthcoming). These considerations give us reason to worry about using Lord’s 
attenuator/intensifier strategy to explain why credences should be coherent. While it technically 
solves the problem, it seems to be committed to implausible claims about how and when defeaters 
are active.  
There is a second problem for expanding Lord’s explanatory strategy to credal coherence, 
which arises independently of the one just discussed. It stems from Lord’s view of what is required 
for someone to possess a normative reason. The fact that my credence in p is x can only serve as 
an intensifier for my reasons to adopt a credence of 1-x in ~p if it is a reason I possess. For this fact 
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to be a reason I possess, have to (be in a position to) know that my credence in p is x. This is 
necessary for me to be in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use the fact that my 
credence in p is x to adopt a credence of 1-x in ~p. This creates two complications: First, this means 
that someone who has a credence of x in p, but isn’t in a position to know this (because introspection 
is difficult sometimes), is not rationally required to be coherent in a permissive case. This is because, 
if you don’t possess a reason, you’re not making a rational mistake by not responding to it. And 
since we’re often bad at introspectively knowing our credences, this would leave many cases in 
which coherence is not required on Lord’s view (although intuitively it is).4 Secondly, one might 
worry that this proposal is too intellectually demanding, because it requires that we can use 
knowledge about our own mental states as reasons. Yet, Lord wants his view to also apply to 
children, who might still lack the ability to form beliefs about their credences. The current proposal 
seems to entail that children who can’t form such beliefs are not rationally required to have 
coherent credences in permissive cases. I don’t think this is a consequence that Lord welcomes.5 
To sum up, if we assume permissivism, there are two problems for explaining coherence 
requirements on credences in terms of possessed normative reasons. The first problem is that the 
way epistemic attenuators and intensifiers have to function to secure coherence doesn’t map onto 
our usual understanding of how they work. The second problem is that for an agent to possess the 
reasons that secure coherence, they have to be in a position to know their credences, which is not 
always the case. These problems come up specifically for reasons-based attempts to explain 
coherence requirements, but not for alternative arguments, such as Dutch book arguments or 
accuracy-based arguments. 
 Perhaps we can avoid these problems if we reject the claim that our evidence is sometimes 
permissive. Does adopting uniqueness give us an unproblematic reasons-based explanation of why 
we should have coherent credences? The idea would be that for any given body of evidence you 
might possess, there is only one rational, coherent credence assignment you can adopt, and so 
permissive cases don’t arise. If your credences differ from this assignment (whether they are 
coherent or incoherent), then you are irrational, because you fail to respond correctly to the 
normative reasons you possess. This proposal mimics the explanation for why contradictory beliefs 
are irrational. This is a bit too fast, however. Most defenders of the uniqueness thesis admit that it 
is often impossible for normal human thinkers to determine which exact credences their evidence 
supports. Hence, even if, say, E, which is everything I am in a position to know, supports precise 
credences of 0.65 in p and 0.35 in ~p, I might not be in a position to know that it does. But this 
means that I don’t possess E as a reason to adopt these credences by Lord’s definition of possession, 
because I don’t meet the practical condition. According to the practical condition, I don’t possess 
                                                        
4 Can Lord’s strategy of using knowledge of how things appear to me be put to use to fix this problem? I think not. In 
fact, it might even lead to ‘rational’ incoherence. Here is why: suppose my credence in p is 0.63, but I don’t know this. 
In fact, I know that it appears to me that my credence in p is 0.65. Lord might be committed in this case to saying that 
the rational credence for me to adopt in ~p is 0.35, making me incoherent.  
5 A similar problem can also arise for outright belief. To generate the problem, there must be permissive cases (e.g. 
cases where my evidence permits both belief in p and suspending judgment about p), in which my introspective abilities 
are insufficient to put me in a position to know whether I believe p or suspend judgment about p. 
 5 
a fact as a normative reason to f unless I am in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use 
r to f. But if I don’t know that E supports some particular precise credence assignment, then I am 
not in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use E to arrive at those credences. And even 
if I adopted the credences that E actually supports, this would not be a manifestation of my ability 
to use my knowledge, because I just got lucky – I could have easily adopted slightly different 
credences that aren’t supported by E. Hence, the problem for the impermissive view is that there 
is no precise credence function that the reasons I possess require or permit me to adopt. Here’s 
again a breakdown of why this is: First, the reasons I possess don’t permit or require that I have 
incoherent credences. Secondly, since I don’t possess reasons to adopt the precise credences that 
are supported by my knowledge (since I fail the practical condition on possession), I am not 
rationally required to adopt those credences. Moreover, if I did adopt those credences, doing so 
would not be rational, because it would not be a correct response to the reasons I possess. For any 
other coherent precise credence function, I can’t rationally adopt it, because the things I know 
don’t support it. The result we were hoping to get from assuming uniqueness was that it would be 
impermissible to adopt any incoherent credences, and that there is some coherent precise credence 
function that I can rationally adopt. The uniqueness view doesn’t deliver this result.  
 Yet, in cases in which I am unable to know which precise credences are supported by my 
knowledge, I might be able to realize something weaker, for example that my evidence doesn’t 
support a credence higher than 0.8 or lower than 0.5. This knowledge can perhaps give me reasons 
that put some constraints on which credences to adopt. Yet, if this makes these cases analogous to 
permissive cases we discussed earlier, the same problems will arise. Another possibility might be 
that I am required to have particular imprecise credences in these cases. However, the imprecise 
solution would presumably bring its own problems, because then the agent would have to know 
which imprecise credences to have based on their evidence, and it would also generate well known 
problems for using one’s credences in decision making.6  
  
2. What Kinds of Attitudes? 
So far, I have left open how credences should be best conceived of in Lord’s framework. One 
standard account of credences takes them to be graded attitudes towards propositions. Hence, 
uncertainty is encoded in the attitude, rather than in its content (although this of course doesn’t 
preclude the possibility of having a graded attitude towards a proposition that also concerns 
probability). This picture unfortunately doesn’t align well with a knowledge-first view of the 
attitudes that are involved in possessing normative reasons. The literature presents us with two 
potential solutions. One option that knowledge-firsters tend to favor is to claim that uncertainty is 
encoded in beliefs about evidential probabilities, which can constitute knowledge in favorable 
circumstances. For example, Bob’s 0.65 credence that the cocktail contains bitters could be 
                                                        
6 A further problem that arises even if we adopt a uniqueness thesis about credences (either precise or imprecise), is 
that it doesn’t rule out a different kind of permissivism, namely regarding whether an agent should adopt an outright 
belief based on their high credence or not. See Littlejohn (forthcoming) for complications this sort of possibility 
generates for Lord’s view. 
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analyzed as Bob knowing that it’s 0.65 likely on his evidence that the cocktail contains bitters 
(assuming his belief satisfies the conditions for knowledge). Unfortunately, ever since knowledge 
norms have become fashionable, people have raised problems for appealing to knowledge of 
evidential probabilities. (See e.g. Cresto 2010, Mueller and Ross 2017, Littlejohn forthcoming, 
Tang forthcoming, and references therein). 
 One issue that creates complications for this type of view is the forgotten evidence problem 
(Tang forthcoming). It is generally thought that I can retain justified beliefs and even knowledge in 
cases in which I have forgotten my original evidence. The same seems plausible for credences. For 
example, suppose I have a 0.95 credence that tango is popular in Finland. When I formed this 
credence, I did so based on good evidence. I have now forgotten my original evidence, but I still 
retain my high credence. Many epistemologists want to say this is rational. But if we conceive of 
credences (that give us possessed normative reasons) as knowledge of evidential probabilities, this 
is a problem, since I can’t know that my evidence makes p x likely when I no longer possess it. 
Perhaps there are alternative ways in which my current evidence could sustain my justification, for 
example my knowledge that I usually form such beliefs based on reliable information (see e.g. 
Conee & Feldman 2001). However, it is questionable whether this backup evidence would support 
the exact credence that my original, but now forgotten evidence supported. Perhaps there is a way 
to get around this problem. In any case, this is just to suggest that appealing to knowledge of 
evidential probabilities will not be a solution that is easy to implement.  
 Another strategy for the knowledge firster could be to adopt Moss’ view of probabilistic 
knowledge (2018). Moss proposes that we should conceive of credences either as graded doxastic 
attitudes towards propositions, or as ungraded doxastic attitudes towards sets of probability spaces. 
She favors the latter option, because she finds that it leads to a more elegant integration between 
treatments of uncertainty in epistemology, semantics, and the philosophy of mind. While this 
proposal avoids some of the problems generated by the evidential probability proposal, it would 
force Lord to give up some other central aspects of his view. Most centrally, Moss’ view requires 
us to rethink what we mean by knowledge being factive, since sets of probability spaces are not 
bearers of truth values in a traditional sense. She must adopt an expressivist, minimalist conception 
of truth and facts. Since normative reasons are taken to be facts, Lord would thus have to take on 
an expressivist picture of what constitutes a reason, which might be a bigger divergence from his 
original view than he’d be willing to take on. My comments on this issue can only scratch the 
surface here, but I hope they demonstrate that integrating a suitable way of representing 
uncertainty into a reasons fundamentalist view is not an easy feat. 
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